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Abstract
Blind source separation algorithms such as independent component
analysis (ICA) are widely used in the analysis of neuroimaging data. In
order to leverage larger sample sizes, different data holders/sites may wish
to collaboratively learn feature representations. However, such datasets
are often privacy-sensitive, precluding centralized analyses that pool the
data at a single site. A recently proposed algorithm uses message-passing
between sites and a central aggregator to perform a decentralized joint
ICA (djICA) without sharing the data. However, this method does not
satisfy formal privacy guarantees. We propose a differentially private al-
gorithm for performing ICA in a decentralized data setting. Differential
privacy provides a formal and mathematically rigorous privacy guarantee
by introducing noise into the messages. Conventional approaches to de-
centralized differentially private algorithms may require too much noise
due to the typically small sample sizes at each site. We leverage a re-
cently proposed correlated noise protocol to remedy the excessive noise
problem of the conventional schemes. We investigate the performance of
the proposed algorithm on synthetic and real fMRI datasets to show that
our algorithm outperforms existing approaches and can sometimes reach
the same level of utility as the corresponding non-private algorithm. This
indicates that it is possible to have meaningful utility while preserving
privacy.
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1 Introduction
Sharing data is a major challenge facing researchers in a number of domains. In
particular, human health studies often involve a modest number of individuals:
privacy concerns often preclude sharing “raw” data with collaborators. Perform-
ing a new joint analysis across the individual data points requires access to indi-
viduals’ data, so research groups often collaborate by performing meta-analyses
which are limited to already-published aggregates or summaries of the data.
Ideally, sites would be able to collaborate in new analyses while still protecting
subjects’ privacy. An example of such a scenario is in neuroimaging research, in
which many individual research groups or sites wish to collaborate [2–5]. Each
site may lack a sufficient number of samples to robustly estimate features on
their own, but the aggregate number of samples across all sites can yield novel
discoveries such as biomarkers for disease. Sending the data samples to a cen-
tral repository or aggregator can enable efficient feature learning, but privacy
concerns and large communication overhead are often prohibitive when sharing
“raw” data.
The privacy problem is exacerbated by previous demonstrations of how mod-
ern signal processing and machine learning algorithms can potentially reveal
information about individuals present in the dataset [6–8]. A mathematically
rigorous framework for protection against such information leaks is differential
privacy [9]. Under differential privacy, the algorithm outputs are randomized in
such a way that the presence or absence of any individual in the dataset does
not significantly affect the computation output. In other words, differentially
private (DP) algorithms offer a quantifiable plausible deniability to the data
owners regarding their participation. The randomization often takes the form
of noise introduced somewhere in the computation, resulting in a loss in per-
formance, or utility. Privacy risk is quantified by a parameter or parameters,
leading to a privacy-utility tradeoff in DP algorithm design.
In this paper, we consider blind source separation for neuroimaging, in which
several individual research groups or sites wish to collaborate. The sample size
at each site is moderate at best and is typically not sufficient for an efficient
feature learning. However, the aggregate number of samples across all sites is
sufficient, as in most statistical learning problems. One option is to send the
data samples to a central repository to enable efficient feature learning, but pri-
vacy concerns and large communication overhead often preclude sharing “raw”
data. This motivates us to develop efficient decentralized privacy-preserving
algorithms that provide utility close to centralized case. Unfortunately, conven-
tional approaches to using differential privacy in decentralized settings require
introducing too much noise, leading to a poor tradeoff. The primary contribu-
tion of this paper is an algorithm for decentralized joint independent component
analysis that guarantees differential privacy with an improved privacy-utility
tradeoff.
Independent component analysis (ICA) is a matrix factorization algorithm
that is one of the most popular blind source separation techniques for neu-
roimaging studies [10]. It assumes that the observed signals are mixtures of
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statistically independent sources and aims to decompose the mixed signals into
those sources. ICA has been widely used to estimate intrinsic connectivity net-
works from brain imaging data (e.g. functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI)). Successful application of ICA on fMRI can be attributed to both spar-
sity and spatial or temporal independence between the underlying sources [10].
We particularly focus on the recently proposed decentralized joint ICA (djICA)
algorithm, which can perform temporal ICA of fMRI data [11]. The goal of
temporal ICA is to identify temporally independent components that represent
activation of different brain regions over time [12]. However, it requires more
samples than are typically available from a single study. This is because the
ratio of spatial to temporal dimensions often requires the aggregate temporal
dimension to be similar to the voxel dimension [11].
A number of modified ICA algorithms exist for joining various data sets [13]
together and performing simultaneous decomposition of data from a number
of subjects and modalities [14]. For instance, group spatial ICA (GICA) is
noteworthy for performing multi-subject analysis of task- and resting-state fMRI
data [15–17]. It assumes that the spatial map components are similar across
subjects. On the other hand, the joint ICA (jICA) [18] algorithm for multi-
modal data fusion assumes that the mixing process is similar over a group of
subjects. However, group temporal ICA also assumes common spatial maps but
pursues statistical independence of timecourses. Consequently, like jICA, the
common spatial maps from temporal ICA describe a common mixing process
among subjects. While very interesting, temporal ICA of fMRI is typically not
investigated because of the small number of time points in each data set, which
leads to unreliable estimates [11]. The decentralized jICA approach overcomes
that limitation by leveraging datasets from multiple sites.
Our Contributions. In this paper, we propose a new algorithm, capeDJICA,
for (, δ)-DP decentralized joint ICA. The algorithm significantly improves upon
our earlier work [1] by taking advantage of a recently proposed correlation as-
sisted private estimation (CAPE) protocol [19]. Our method adds correlated
noise to the output of each site to guarantee privacy locally and a central aggre-
gator combines these noisy outputs to produce an improved estimate. For some
parameter regimes, the aggregator can achieve the same level of noise variance
as centralized scenario. We employ a randomized gradient descent following the
CAPE protocol and show that mitigates the excessive noise problem of conven-
tional decentralized DP gradient descent approaches. To handle the scenarios
typically found in practice, we provide two improvements on the original CAPE
protocol which may be of independent interest. The first is to extend the CAPE
scheme to incorporate asymmetric privacy requirements or sample sizes at the
sites. The second is a an analysis of capeDJICA using the Re´nyi Differential
Privacy (RDP) [20]. This is necessary because capeDJICA requires multiple
rounds of communication. We present an analysis based on the moments ac-
countant [21] for keeping track of the privacy loss at each iteration.
Experimentally, we compare our proposed algorithm with the existing state-
of-the-art algorithm and a non-private algorithm. We show that the proposed
algorithm outperforms the conventional privacy-preserving algorithm [1] and
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Figure 1: The structure of the network: left – conventional, right – CAPE
can provide utility very close to that of the non-private algorithm [11] for some
parameter choices. We analyze the variation of utility with different privacy
levels, number of samples and some other key parameters. The results show that
our algorithm achieves very good utility on both synthetic and real datasets,
while providing strong privacy guarantees. By analyzing our proposed algorithm
using the moments accountant, we show that we can achieve performance very
close to that of non-private algorithm, even for strict privacy requirements.
2 Problem Formulation
Notation. We denote vectors, matrices and scalars with bold lower case letters
(x), bold upper case letters (X) and unbolded letters (M), respectively. We
denote indices with smaller case letters and they typically run from 1 to their
upper-case versions (m ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M} , [M ]). The n-th column of the matrix
X is denoted as xn. We denote the Euclidean (or L2) norm of a vector and
the spectral norm of a matrix with ‖ · ‖2 and the Frobenius norm with ‖ · ‖F .
Finally, the density of the standard Normal random variable is given by φ(x) =(
1/
√
2pi
)
exp
(−x2/2).
The ICA Model. In this paper we consider the generative ICA model as
in [1, 11]. In the centralized scenario, the independent sources S ∈ RR×N are
composed of N observations from R statistically independent components. We
have a linear mixing process defined by a mixing matrix A ∈ RD×R, which forms
the observed data X ∈ RD×N as a product X = AS. Many ICA algorithms pro-
pose recovering the unmixing matrix W = A−1, assuming A is invertible [11],
by trying to maximize independence between rows of the product WX. The
maximal information transfer (infomax) [22] is a popular heuristic for estimat-
ing W that maximizes an entropy functional related to WX. More specifically,
the objective of Infomax ICA can be expressed as
W∗ = argmax
W
h(g(WX)). (1)
Here, g(·) is the sigmoid function and is given by: g(z) = 11+exp(−z) . Addition-
ally, h(z) is the (differential) entropy of a random vector z with joint density q:
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h(z) = − ∫ q(z) log q(z)dz. Note that the function g(·) is applied element-wise
for matrix-valued arguments. That is, g(Z) is a matrix with the same size as Z
and [g(Z)]ij = g([Z]ij)).
The Decentralized Data Problem. We consider a decentralized-data model
with S sites (see Figure 1). There is a central node that acts as an aggregator.
We assume that all parties are “honest but curious”. That is, all parties follow
the protocol honestly but a subset can collude (maybe with an external adver-
sary) to learn other site’s data/function output. Each site s has a collection
of data matrices {Xs,m ∈ RD×Nt : m = 1, . . . ,Ms} consisting of a total time
course of length Nt time points over D voxels for Ms individuals. We assume the
data samples in the local sites are disjoint and come from different individuals.
Sites concatenate their local data matrices temporally to form a D×NtMs data
matrix Xs ∈ RD×Ns , where Ns = NtMs. Let N =
∑S
s=1Ns be the total num-
ber of samples and M =
∑S
s=1Ms be the total number of individuals (across
all sites). We assume a global mixing matrix A ∈ RD×R generates the time
courses in Xs from underlying sources Ss ∈ RR×Ns at each site. This yields the
following model:
X = [AS1 . . .ASS ] = [X1 . . .XS ] ∈ RD×N . (2)
We want to compute the global unmixing matrix W ∈ RR×D corresponding
to the Moore-Penrose pseudo-inverse of A, denoted A+, in the decentralized
setting. Because sharing the raw data between sites is often impossible due to
privacy concerns and communication cost, we develop methods that guarantee
differential privacy [9]. More specifically, our goal is to use DP estimates of the
local gradients to compute the global unmixing matrix W such that it closely
approximates the true global unmixing matrix while preserving privacy.
Definition 1 ((, δ)-Differential Privacy [9]). An algorithm A(D) taking values
in a set T provides (, δ)-differential privacy if Pr[A(D) ∈ S] ≤ exp() Pr[A(D′) ∈
S] + δ, for all measurable S ⊆ T and all data sets D and D′ differing in a single
entry (neighboring datasets).
One way to interpret this is that the probability of the output of an algorithm
is not changed significantly if the input database is changed by just one entry.
Here,  and δ are privacy parameters, where lower  and δ ensure more privacy.
The parameter δ can be interpreted as the probability that the algorithm fails
to provide privacy risk . Several mechanisms can be employed to ensure that
an algorithm satisfies differential privacy. Additive noise mechanisms such as
the Gaussian or Laplace mechanisms [9, 23] and random sampling using the
exponential mechanism [24] are among the most common ones. For additive
noise mechanisms, the standard deviation of the noise is scaled to the sensitivity
of the computation.
Definition 2 (L2-sensitivity [9]). The L2-sensitivity of a vector-valued function
f(D) is ∆ := maxD,D′ ‖f(D)−f(D′)‖2, where D and D′ are neighboring datasets.
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Definition 3 (Gaussian Mechanism [23]). Let f : D 7→ RD be an arbitrary
D-dimensional function with L2-sensitivity ∆. The Gaussian Mechanism with
parameter τ adds noise scaled to N (0, τ2) to each of the D components of the
output and satisfies (, δ) differential privacy if τ ≥ ∆
√
2 log 1.25δ .
Note that, for any given (, δ) pair, we can calculate a noise variance τ2 such
that addition of a noise term drawn from N (0, τ2) guarantees (, δ)-differential
privacy. There are infinitely many (, δ) pairs that yield the same τ2. Therefore,
we parameterize our methods using τ2 [25] in this paper.
Definition 4 (Re´nyi Differential Privacy [20]). A randomized mechanism A :
D 7→ T is (α, r)-Re´nyi differentially private if, for any adjacent D,D′ ∈
D, the following holds: Dα (A(D)‖A(D′)) ≤ r. Here, Dα (P (x)‖Q(x)) =
1
α−1 logEx∼Q
(
P (x)
Q(x)
)α
and P (x) and Q(x) are probability density functions de-
fined on T.
In addition to conventional privacy analysis, we present an analysis of our al-
gorithm using RDP. It has been shown that conventional privacy analysis of
multi-shot algorithms tend to exaggerate the total privacy loss [20, 21]. RDP
offers a much simpler composition rule that is shown to be tight [20].
Conventional Decentralized DP Computations. We use an example [19,
25] to demonstrate the problem with the existing DP decentralized computa-
tions. Assume that in our decentralized-data setting (see Figure 1(a)), each site
s ∈ [S] holds Ns scalar data samples xn,s ∈ [0, 1] as the entries of xs ∈ RNs .
Our goal is to compute and release the DP global mean f(·) of all the N sam-
ples. We assume Ns =
N
S for simplicity. Without privacy constraints, the
sites can send as = f(xs) to the aggregator. The average computed by aggre-
gator ( 1S
∑S
s=1 as) is exactly equal to the average when all the data samples
are available in the aggregator node. However, in our honest-but-curious set-
ting, the sites can employ the conventional decentralized DP computation tech-
nique to release (send to the aggregator node) a DP estimate of the function
f(xs) of their local data xs as: aˆs = f(xs) + es, where es ∼ N
(
0, τ2s
)
and
τs =
1
Ns
√
2 log 1.25δ =
S
N
√
2 log 1.25δ . The aggregator can then compute the
(, δ)-DP approximate average as aconv =
1
S
∑S
s=1 aˆs. We observe
aconv =
1
S
S∑
s=1
aˆs =
1
S
S∑
s=1
as +
1
S
S∑
s=1
es.
The variance of the estimator aconv is S · τ
2
s
S2
=
τ2s
S
, τ2conv. However, if we had all
the data samples in the central aggregator (centralized/pooled-data scenario),
we could compute the (, δ) DP average as apool =
1
N
∑N
n=1 xn + epool, where
epool ∼ N
(
0, τ2pool
)
and τpool =
1
N
√
2 log 1.25δ =
τs
S . We observe the ratio:
τ2pool
τ2conv
=
τ2s /S
2
τ2s /S
= 1S . That is, the decentralized DP averaging scheme will always
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Algorithm 1 Generate zero-sum noise [19]
Require: Local noise variances {τ2s }; security parameter λ, threshold value t
1: Each site generate eˆs ∼ N (0, τ2s )
2: Aggregator computes
∑S
s=1 eˆs according to SecureAgg(λ, t) [28]
3: Aggregator broadcasts
∑S
s=1 eˆs to all sites s ∈ {1, . . . , S}
4: Each site computes es = eˆs − 1S
∑S
s′=1 eˆs′
5: return es
result in a poorer performance than the pooled data case. The recently proposed
CAPE protocol [19] improves the performance of such systems by assuming some
reasonable resources.
3 Improved Differentially Private djICA
As mentioned before, we focus on the djICA algorithm [11] for performing tem-
poral ICA of fMRI data. Our goal is to compute the privacy-preserving global
spatial maps utilizing all samples across all the sites. To that end, we need
to perform a multi-round decentralized gradient descent for solving (1). One
option is to employ the conventional DP gradient descent [26, 27]: computing
the sensitivity [9] of the gradient and then adding noise scaled to the sensitiv-
ity. However, this would lead to a significantly noisier estimate of the spatial
maps, as outlined in Section 2 (see Section 6 for an empirical validation). For
an efficient spatial map estimation that can achieve the same level of noise as
the pooled-data scenario, we can employ the recently proposed CAPE scheme.
CAPE can benefit a broad class of functions whose sensitivities satisfy some
conditions [19]. Examples include the empirical average loss functions used in
machine learning. In the following, we first briefly review the CAPE scheme.
We then propose an extension to the CAPE scheme so that it can incorporate
unequal sample size/privacy requirements at sites. Next, we discuss the de-
centralized DP Principal Component Analysis (PCA) algorithm [25], which is
a key preprocessing step for our proposed algorithm. Finally, we demonstrate
that we can adapt the CAPE scheme to develope a DP djICA algorithm that
offers significant improvements over our previous work [1].
3.1 The Correlation Assisted Private Estimation Scheme
Recall our decentralized data setting and assume that all of the S sites and the
central node follow the protocol honestly. However, up to SC =
⌈
S
3
⌉ − 1 sites
can collude with an adversary to learn about some site’s data/function output.
The central node is also honest-but-curious (and therefore, can collude with an
adversary). An adversary can observe the outputs from each site, as well as the
output from the aggregator. Additionally, the adversary can know everything
about the colluding sites (including their private data). We denote the number
of non-colluding sites with SH such that S = SC + SH (see Figure 1(b)).
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Algorithm 2 Correlation Assisted Private Estimation (CAPE) [19]
Require: Data samples {xs}, local noise variances {τ2s }
1: for s = 1, . . . , S do . at each site
2: Generate es according to Algorithm 1
3: Generate gs ∼ N (0, τ2g ) with τ2g = τ
2
s
S
4: Compute and send aˆs ← f(xs) + es + gs
5: end for
6: Compute acape ← 1S
∑S
s=1 aˆs . at the aggregator
7: return acape
CAPE employs a correlated noise addition scheme [19] to: i) ensure (, δ)
differential privacy for the algorithm output from each site and ii) achieve the
noise level of the pooled data scenario in the final output from the aggregator.
Each site s releases/sends aˆs = f(xs) + es + gs, where es and gs are two noise
terms. The noise gs ∼ N (0, τ2g ) is generated locally whereas the noise es ∼
N (0, τ2e ) is generated jointly with all other sites such that
∑S
s=1 es = 0. CAPE
employs the secure aggregation protocol (SecureAgg) by Bonawitz et al. [28] to
generate the zero-sum noise terms {es} (see Algorithm 1). The variances of es
and gs are chosen to ensure that the noise es + gs is sufficient to provide (, δ)-
differential privacy guarantee to f(xs). The chosen variance of gs also ensures
that the output from the aggregator would have the same noise variance as the
DP pooled-data scenario. The aggregator computes the following quantity (in
Step 6 of Algorithm 2):
acape =
1
S
S∑
s=1
aˆs =
1
N
N∑
n=1
xn +
1
S
S∑
s=1
gs,
where we used
∑
s es = 0. The complete procedure is shown in Algorithm 2.
The variance of the estimator acape is τ
2
cape =
τ2s
S2 = τ
2
pool, which is the exactly
the same as if all the data were present at the aggregator (see Lemma 1). The
details of the CAPE protocol along with the necessary Theorem, Propositions
and Lemma are shown in Appendix B.
3.2 Unequal Sample Sizes at Sites
It has been shown [19] that CAPE achieves the smallest noise variance at the
aggregator (i.e., the ratio H(n) = τ2cape/τ
2
pool, where n , [N1, N2, . . . , NS ], is
the smallest) in the symmetric setting (i.e., Ns = N/S). However, in practice,
there would be scenarios where different sites have different privacy requirements
and/or sample sizes. Additionally, sites may want the aggregator to use different
weights for different sites (possibly according to the quality of the output from
a site). A scheme for doing so is shown in [25]. In this work, we propose a
generalization of the CAPE scheme that can be applied in asymmetric settings.
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Let us assume that site s requires local noise standard deviation τs for en-
suring (s, δs)-differential privacy for its output, where τs =
1
Nss
√
2 log 1.25δs , ac-
cording to the Gaussian mechanism [9]. As before, we intend to parameterize our
algorithm using {τs} to abstract away {(s, δs, Ns)}. To initiate the CAPE pro-
tocol, each site will generate eˆs ∼ N (0, σ2s) and gs ∼ N (0, τ2gs). The aggregator
intends to compute a weighted average of each site’s data/output with weights
selected according to some quality measure. For example, if the aggregator
knows that a particular site is suffering from more noisy observations than other
sites, it can choose to give the output from that site less weight while combining
the site results. Let us denote the weights by {µs} such that
∑S
s=1 µs = 1 and
µs ≥ 0. First, the aggregator computes
∑S
s=1 µseˆs using the SecureAgg proto-
col [28] and broadcasts it to all sites. Each site then sets es = eˆs− 1µsS
∑S
i=1 µieˆi,
to achieve
∑S
s=1 µses = 0 and releases aˆs = f(xs)+es+gs. Now, the aggregator
computes
acape =
S∑
s=1
µsaˆs =
S∑
s=1
µsf(xs) +
S∑
s=1
µsgs,
where we used
∑S
s=1 µses = 0. In order to achieve the same utility as the pooled
data scenario (i.e. τ2pool = τ
2
cape), we need
Var
[
S∑
s=1
µsgs
]
= τ2pool =⇒
S∑
s=1
µ2sτ
2
gs = τ
2
pool.
Additionally, for guaranteeing privacy to the local sites, we need τ2es + τ
2
gs ≥ τ2s ,
where τ2es is the variance of es and is a function of σ
2
s . With these constraints,
we can formulate a feasibility problem to solve for the unknown noise variances
{σ2s , τ2gs} as
minimize 0
subject to τ2es + τ
2
gs ≥ τ2s ;
S∑
s=1
µ2sτ
2
gs = τ
2
pool,
for all s ∈ [S], where {µs}, τpool and {τs} are known to the aggregator. For this
problem, multiple solutions are possible. We present one solution in Appendix A
along with the detailed privacy analysis.
3.3 Decentralized Differentially Private PCA
Neuroimaging data samples are generally very high dimensional. For a com-
putationally light spatial map estimation process, we require an efficient and
privacy-preserving algorithm to reduce the sample dimension. To that end, we
employ the recently proposed [25] DP decentralized PCA algorithm (capePCA)
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Algorithm 3 Improved Decentralized Differentially Private PCA
(capePCA) [25]
Require: Data matrix Xs ∈ RD×Ns with ‖xs,n‖2 ≤ 1, local noise variances
{τ2s } for s ∈ [S]; reduced dimension R
1: for s = 1, 2, . . . , S do . at the local sites
2: Generate Es ∈ RD×D using Algorithm 1 (element-wise)
3: Compute Cs ← 1NsXsX>s
4: Generate D×D symmetric Gs, where {[Gs]ij : i ∈ [D], j ≤ i} are drawn
i.i.d. ∼ N (0, τ2g = 1S τ2s ), [Gs]ij = [Gs]ji
5: Compute and send: Cˆs ← Cs + Es + Gs
6: end for
7: Compute Cˆ← 1S
∑S
s=1 Cˆs . at the aggregator
8: Perform SVD: Cˆ = VΛV>
9: Release / send to sites: VR
10: return VR
as a preprocessing step of our proposed capeDJICA algorithm. Recall our honest-
but-curious setup: a system of S different sites with disjoint datasets and a
central node or aggregator. The D ×Ns data matrix in site s ∈ [S] is denoted
by Xs. For simplicity, we assume that the observed samples are mean-centered.
We employ capePCA algorithm to approximate the low-rank subspace VR in the
decentralized setting, while guaranteeing differential privacy. We have shown
a slightly modified version of the original capePCA algorithm in Algorithm 3
to match the robust CAPE scheme [19] we reviewed in Section 3.1. Note that
the DP decentralized PCA scheme proposed in [29] was limited by the larger
variance of the additive noise at the local sites due to the smaller sample size.
The capePCA alleviates this problem using the CAPE scheme and achieves the
same utility as the pooled data scenario in the symmetric setting.
3.4 Proposed Improved Differentially Private djICA
In this section, we propose an algorithm that improves upon our previous de-
centralized DP djICA algorithm [1] and achieves the same utility as the DP
pooled-data scenario in certain regimes. Recall our decentralized data setup:
there are S sites and a central aggregator (see Figure 1(b)). Each site s has
data from Ms individuals, which are concatenated temporally to form the local
data matrix Xs ∈ RD×Ns . The global mixing matrix A ∈ RD×R is assumed to
generate the time courses in Xs from underlying sources Ss ∈ RR×Ns at each
site. That is: X = [AS1 . . .ASS ] ∈ RD×N . We estimate the DP global unmix-
ing matrix W ∈ RR×D ≈ A+ in the decentralized setting with a multi-round
gradient descent that employs the CAPE protocol.
As mentioned before, we employ the capePCA algorithm [25] (Algorithm 3)
to estimate an efficient and privacy-preserving row-rank subspace and thereby
reduce the dimension of the samples before solving the optimization problem of
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Algorithm 4 Improved Differentially Private Decentralized Joint ICA
(capeDJICA)
Require: data {Xrs ∈ RR×Ns : s ∈ [S]}, tolerance level t = 10−6, maximum
iterations J , ‖∆W(0)‖22 = t, initial learning rate ρ = 0.015/ log(R), local
noise standard deviations {τsG, τsh}, gradient bounds {BG, Bh}
1: Initialize j = 0, W ∈ RR×R . for example, W = I
2: while j < J , ‖∆W(j)‖22 ≥ t do
3: for all sites s = 1, 2, . . . , S do
4: Generate EGs ∈ RR×R and ehs ∈ RR using Algorithm 1 (element-wise)
5: Generate KGs ∈ RR×R and khs ∈ RR, as described in the text
6: Compute Zs(j) = W(j − 1)Xs + b(j − 1)1>
7: Compute Yˆs(j) = 1− 2g(Zs(j))
8: Compute Gs(j) =
1
Ns
∑Ns
n=1 Gs,n(j), where Gs,n(j) =
(I+yˆs,nz>s,n)W(j−1)
max
(
1, 1BG
∥∥(I+yˆs,nz>s,n)W(j−1)∥∥F)
9: Compute hs(j) =
1
Ns
∑Ns
n=1 hs,n(j), where hs,n(j) =
yˆs,n
max
(
1, 1Bh
∥∥yˆs,n∥∥
2
)
10: Compute Gˆs(j) = Gs(j) + E
G
s + K
G
s
11: Compute hˆs(j) = hs(j) + e
h
s + k
h
s
12: Send Gˆs(j) and hˆs(j) to the aggregator
13: end for
14: Compute ∆W(j) = ρ
1
S
∑S
s=1 Gˆs(j) . at the aggregator, update global
variables
15: Compute ∆b(j) = ρ
1
S
∑S
s=1 hˆs(j)
16: Compute W(j) = W(j − 1) + ∆W(j)
17: Compute b(j) = b(j − 1) + ∆b(j)
18: Check upper bound and perform learning rate adjustment (if needed)
19: Send global W(j) and b(j) back to each site
20: j ← j + 1
21: end while
22: return The current W(j)
(1). Let the output of capePCA to be VR ∈ RD×R, which is sent to the sites
from the aggregator. Then the reduced dimensional (R×Ns) data matrix at site
s is denoted by: Xrs = V
>
RXs. These projected samples are the inputs to the
proposed capeDJICA algorithm that estimates the unmixing matrix W. Note
that, even though the preprocessing is performed satisfying differential privacy,
the maximization to solve (1) itself may leak information about the local data
since it relies on iterative message-passing with the aggregator. More specifi-
cally, the maximization is performed through a gradient descent [30], where the
gradient is to be computed in a decentralized fashion. That is, the algorithm
depends on the data samples through the gradients. Our proposed capeDJICA
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algorithm employs the CAPE protocol to perform the privacy-preserving decen-
tralized gradient descent to solve for W.
The gradient of the empirical average loss function with respect to W at
site s is given [11] by
Gs =
1
Ns
(
NsI + (1− 2Ys) Z>s
)
W, (3)
where Zs = WX
r
s + b1
>, Ys = g (Zs); b ∈ RR is the bias and 1 is a vector of
ones. If we denote 1− 2Ys with Yˆs then we have
Gs =
1
Ns
(
NsI + YˆsZ
>
s
)
W =
1
Ns
Ns∑
n=1
(
I + yˆs,nz
>
s,n
)
W.
We can consider
(
I + yˆs,nz
>
s,n
)
W to be the gradient of the loss function cor-
responding to a single data sample. Therefore, the gradient of the average loss
function at site s is essentially the average of the gradient of the loss function
corresponding to each sample. Note that this gradient estimate is needed to be
sent to the aggregator from the site. Therefore, we need to approximate this
gradient satisfying differential privacy. To that end, let us consider that the
gradient due to each sample satisfies∥∥(I + yˆs,nz>s,n)W∥∥F ≤ BG, (4)
where BG is some constant. It is easy to see that by changing one data sample
(i.e., for a neighboring dataset), the gradient at site s can change by at most
2BG
Ns
. Therefore, the L2 sensitivity of the function f(Xs) = Gs is
∆sG =
2BG
Ns
. (5)
In addition to the unmixing matrix W, we update a bias term b using a gradient
descent [11]. The gradient of the empirical average loss function with respect
to the bias at site s is given [11] by
hs =
1
Ns
Ns∑
n=1
yˆs,n. (6)
Similar to the case of Gs, we can find the L2 sensitivity of the function f(Xs) =
hs as
∆sh =
2Bh
Ns
, (7)
where
‖yˆs,n‖2 ≤ Bh. (8)
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According to the Gaussian mechanism [9], computing (, δ) DP approximates of
Gs and hs requires additive noise standard deviations τ
s
G and τ
s
h, respectively,
satisfy
τsG =
∆sG

√
2 log
1.25
δ
, τsh =
∆sh

√
2 log
1.25
δ
. (9)
As mentioned before, we employ the CAPE protocol to combine the gradients
from the sites at the aggregator to achieve the same utility level as that of the
pooled data scenario. More specifically, each site generates two noise terms:
EGs ∈ RR×R and ehs ∈ RR, collectively among all sites (element-wise, according
to Algorithm 1) at each iteration round. Additionally, each site s generates the
following two noise terms locally at each iteration:
• KGs ∈ RR×R with [KGs ]ij drawn i.i.d. ∼ N (0, τ2Gk) and τ2Gk = 1S τsG2
• khs ∈ RR with [khs ]i drawn i.i.d. ∼ N (0, τ2hk) and τ2hk = 1S τsh2.
At each iteration round, the sites compute the noisy estimates of the gradients
of W and b:
Gˆs = Gs + E
G
s + K
G
s , hˆs = hs + e
h
s + k
h
s .
These two terms are then sent to the aggregator and the aggregator computes:
∆W = ρ
1
S
∑S
s=1 Gˆs and ∆b = ρ
1
S
∑S
s=1 hˆs, where ρ is the learning rate. These
gradient estimates are then used to update the variables W and b. By Lemma 1,
the variances of the noise of the two estimates: ∆W and ∆b, are exactly the same
as the pooled-data scenario in the symmetric setting. The complete algorithm
is shown in Algorithm 4. Note that, one does not need to explicitly find the
bounds in (4) and (8). Instead, the gradients due to each sample can be clipped
to some pre-determined BG or Bh in L2 norm sense. That is, we can replace
Gs,n =
(
I + yˆs,nz
>
s,n
)
W with
Gs,n =
Gs,n
max
(
1,
‖Gs,n‖F
BG
) .
Similarly, we can replace hs,n = yˆs,n with
hs,n =
hs,n
max
(
1,
‖hs,n‖2
Bh
) .
We note that this norm clipping has a few consequences [21]. It destroys the
unbiasedness of the gradient estimate. If we choose BG and Bh to be too
small, the average clipped gradient may be a poor estimate of the true gradient.
Moreover, BG and Bh dictates the additive noise level. In general, clipping
prescribes taking a smaller step downhill towards the optimal point [26] and
may slow down the convergence.
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4 Privacy Analysis of capeDJICA
In this section, we first present a theorem that provides the privacy guarantee
of the capeDJICA algorithm using the conventional composition theorem [23].
However, we note that the capeDJICA algorithm involves a multi-round gradient
descent and conventional privacy analysis may exaggerate the privacy loss. For
a better characterization of the privacy guarantee, we analyze the capeDJICA
algorithm with Re´nyi Differential Privacy (RDP) [20]. Finally, we compute
the overall privacy loss of the capeDJICA algorithm using the moments accoun-
tant [21] to keep a better track of the privacy loss at each iteration.
Theorem 1 (Privacy of capeDJICA Algorithm). Consider Algorithm 4 in the
decentralized data setting of Section 2 with Ns =
N
S , τ
s
G = τG and τ
s
h = τh
for all sites s ∈ [S]. Suppose that at most SC =
⌈
S
3
⌉ − 1 sites can collude
after execution and the required number of iterations is J∗. Then Algorithm
4 computes an (2J∗, 2J∗δ)-DP approximation to the optimal unmixing matrix
W∗, where (, δ) satisfy the relation δ = 2 σz−µz φ
(
−µz
σz
)
and (µz, σz) are given
by (13) and (14), respectively.
Proof. The proof of Theorem 1 follows from using the Gaussian mechanism [9],
the decentralized Stochastic Gradient Descent algorithm [21,26,27], the L2 sen-
sitivities of the functions f(Xs) = Gs and f(Xs) = hs and the privacy of the
CAPE scheme [19]. We recall that the data samples in each site are disjoint. By
the CAPE scheme (see Theorem 2), each iteration round is (2, 2δ)-DP. If the
required total number of iterations is J∗ then by composition theorem of dif-
ferential privacy [23], the capeDJICA algorithm satisfies (2J∗, 2J∗δ)-differential
privacy, where (, δ) satisfy the relation δ = 2 σz−µz φ
(
−µz
σz
)
.
4.1 Privacy Analysis using Re´nyi Differential Privacy
We now analyze the capeDJICA algorithm with Re´nyi Differential Privacy [20].
Analyzing the total privacy loss of a multi-shot algorithm, each stage of which
is DP, is a challenging task. It has been shown [20, 21] that the advanced
composition theorem [23] for (, δ)-differential privacy can be loose. The main
reason is that one can formulate infinitely many (, δ)-DP algorithms for a given
noise variance τ2. RDP offers a much simpler composition rule that is shown
to be tight [20]. We start our analysis of the capeDJICA algorithm by reviewing
some propoerties of RDP [20].
Proposition 1 (From RDP to differential privacy [20]). If A is an (α, r)-RDP
mechanism, then it also satisfies
(
r +
log 1δr
α−1 , δr
)
-differential privacy for any
0 < δr < 1.
Proposition 2 (Composition of RDP [20]). Let A : D 7→ T1 be (α, r1)-RDP
and B : T1 × D 7→ T2 be (α, r2)-RDP, then the mechanism defined as (X,Y ),
where X ∼ A(D) and Y ∼ B(X,D), satisfies (α, r1 + r2)-RDP.
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Proposition 3 (RDP and Gaussian Mechanism [20]). If A has L2 sensitivity
1, then the Gaussian mechanism GσA(D) = A(D) + E, where E ∼ N (0, σ2)
satisfies (α, α2σ2 )-RDP. Additionally, a composition of J Gaussian mechanisms,
each with parameter σ will have the RDP curve of a Gaussian mechanism with
parameter σ√
J
.
The proofs of the Propositions 1, 2 and 3 are provided in [20]. Now, we are in a
position to analyze the proposed capeDJICA algorithm with RDP composition.
Recall that, at each iteration j of capeDJICA, we compute the noisy estimates
of the gradients: ∆W(j) and ∆b(j). As we employed the CAPE scheme in the
symmetric setting, the variances of noise at the aggregator for ∆W(j) and ∆b(j)
are:
σ2W = ρ
2τpoolG
2
and σ2b = ρ
2τpoolh
2
.
From Proposition 3, we have that the computation of ∆W(j) is (α,
α
2σ2W
)-RDP.
Similarly, the computation of ∆b(j) is (α,
α
2σ2b
)-RDP. By Proposition 2, we have
that each iteration step of capeDJICA is
(
α, α2
(
1
σ2W
+ 1
σ2b
))
-RDP. If we denote
the number of required iterations for reaching convergence in capeDJICA by J∗
then, under J∗-fold composition of RDP, the overall capeDJICA algorithm is
(α, αJ
∗
2σ2RDP
)-RDP, where
1
σ2RDP
=
(
1
σ2W
+
1
σ2b
)
.
From Proposition 1, we can conclude that the capeDJICA algorithm satisfies(
αJ∗
2σ2RDP
+
log 1δr
α−1 , δr
)
-differential privacy for any 0 < δr < 1. For a given δr, we
find the optimal αopt as:
αopt = 1 +
√
2
J∗
σ2RDP log
1
δr
. (10)
Therefore, the capeDJICA algorithm is
(
αoptJ
∗
2σ2RDP
+
log 1δr
αopt−1 , δr
)
-DP for any 0 <
δr < 1.
4.2 Privacy Accounting using Moments Accountant
In this section, we use the moments accountant [21] framework to compute the
overall privacy loss of our capeDJICA algorithm. Moments accountant can be
used to achieve a much smaller overall  than the strong composition theo-
rem [23]. As mentioned before, na¨ıvely employing the additive nature of the
privacy loss results in the worst case analysis, i.e., assumes that each iteration
step exposes the worst privacy risk and this exaggerates the total privacy loss.
However, in practice, the privacy loss is a random variable that depends on the
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dataset and is typically well-behaved (concentrated around its expected value).
Let us consider the randomized mechanism A : D 7→ T. For a particular out-
come o ∈ T of the mechanism and neighboring datasets D,D′ ∈ D, the privacy
loss random variable is defined [21] as
Z = log
Pr[A(D) = o]
Pr[A(D′) = o] w.p. Pr[A(D) = o]. (11)
Note that the basic idea of [21] for accounting for the total privacy loss is to
compute the moment generating function (MGF) of Z for each iteration, use
composition to get the MGF of the complete algorithm and then use that to
compute final privacy parameters (see Theorem 2 of [21]). The stepwise moment
for any t at iteration j is defined [21] as
αj(t) = sup
D,D′
logE [exp(tZ)] . (12)
If total number of iterations is J∗ then the overall moment is upper bounded
as α(t) ≤ ∑J∗j=1 αj(t). Finally, for any given  > 0, the overall mechanism
is (, δ) DP for δ = mint exp (α(t)− t). We now employ the framework to
our capeDJICA algorithm and find the best  for a given δ. For a Gaussian
mechanism GσA(D) = A(D)+E, where E ∼ N (0, σ2), the privacy loss random
variable defined in (11) can be written as
Z = log
exp
(
− 12σ2 (o− fD)2
)
exp
(
− 12σ2 (o− f ′D)2
)
=
1
2σ2
(
2o(fD − f ′D)− (f2D − f ′D2)
)
.
Now,
E[exp(tZ)] =∫
o
exp
(
t
2σ2
(
2o(fD − f ′D)− (f2D − f ′D2)
))
· 1√
2piσ2
exp
(
− 1
2σ2
(o− fD)2
)
do
=
σ√
fD − f ′D
exp
(
(fD − f ′D)
t2σ2 + t(fD − f ′D)
2σ2
)
,
where the last equality follows from the moment generating function of gener-
alized Gaussian and some simple algebra. If the L2 sensitivity of the function
A(D) is ∆ then
αj(t) =
sup
D,D′
log
σ√
fD − f ′D
+
fD − f ′D
2σ2
(
t2σ2 + t(fD − f ′D)
)
= log
σ√
∆
+
∆
2σ2
(
t2σ2 + t∆
)
.
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We can compute the upper bound of the overall moment
α(t) ≤
J∗∑
j=1
αj(t)
= J∗
(
log
σ√
∆
+
∆
2σ2
(
t2σ2 + t∆
))
.
Now, for any given  > 0, we have
δ = min
t
exp (α(t)− t)
= min
t
exp
(
J∗
(
log
σ√
∆
+
∆
2σ2
(
t2σ2 + t∆
))− t) .
We compute the minimizing t as
topt =

J∗∆
− ∆
2σ2
.
Using this, we find δopt
δopt = exp
(
J∗ log
σ√
∆
+
J∗∆
2
(

J∗∆
− ∆
2σ2
)2
+(
J∗∆2
2σ2
− 
)(

J∗∆
− ∆
2σ2
))
.
As we are interested in finding the best  for a given δ, we rearrange the above
equation to solve for  as
 =
1
2a
(
−b±
√
b2 − 4ac
)
,
where a = 12J∗∆ , b = − ∆2σ2 and c = log δ− J∗ log σ√∆ + J
∗∆3
8σ4 . For our proposed
capeDJICA algorithm, we release two noisy gradients: ∆W(j) and ∆b(j), at
iteration j with noise variances σ2W and σ
2
b, respectively. Adjusting for this,
we plot the total  against the total iterations J∗ for the basic composition and
the moments accountant in Figure 2. We observe that the moments accountant
method provides a much smaller total  than the basic composition (which grows
linearly with J∗).
5 Performance Analysis of capeDJICA
5.1 Performance Gain with Correlated Noise
The existing DP djICA algorithm [1] achieved J∗-differential privacy (where J∗
is the total number of iterations required for convergence) by adding a noise
term to the local estimate of the source (i.e., Zs(j)). Although the algorithm
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Figure 2: Variation of total  with number of iterations J∗: σ2W = σ
2
b = 0.001
and δ = 1/N . Moments accountant method provides a much smaller overall 
than the basic composition.
offered a “pure” DP djICA procedure, there are a few shortcomings. The cost of
achieving pure differential-privacy (i.e., employing the Laplace mechanism [9])
was that the noise variance was dependent on R and the norm of the most-
recent W. Moreover, the neighboring dataset condition was met by restricting
the L2-norm of the samples to satisfy ‖xn‖2 ≤ 12√D , which can be too limiting
for datasets with large ambient dimensions. Last but not the least, the DP
PCA preprocessing step was less fault tolerant than the one employed in this
paper. By employing the CAPE protocol in the preprocessing stage and also
in the optimization process, we expect to gain a significant performance boost.
We validate the performance gain in the Experimental Results (Section 6).
5.2 Convergence of capeDJICA Algorithm
We note that the gradient estimate at the aggregator (Step 14 in Algorithm 4)
essentially contains the noise ρS
∑S
s=1 K
G
s , which is zero mean. Therefore, the
convergence of Algorithm 4 is guaranteed [31]. Since the total additive noise
variance is smaller than the conventional case by a factor of S, the convergence
rate is faster than the conventional case.
5.3 Communication Cost
We analyze the total communication cost associated with the proposed capeDJICA
algorithm. At each iteration round, we need to generate two zero-sum noise
terms, which entails O(S + R2) communication complexity of the sites and
O(S2 + SR2) communication complexity of the aggregator [28]. Each site com-
putes the noisy gradient and sends one R × R matrix and one R dimensional
18
Figure 3: Variation of qNGI and overall  with privacy parameter ifor: (a)-
(b) synthetic fMRI data, (c)-(d) real fMRI data. Fixed parameters: S = 4,
δ = 10−5. For a given privacy budget (performance requirement), the user can
use the overall  plot on the right y-axis, shown with solid lines, (qNGI plot on
the left y-axis, shown with dashed lines) to find the required i on the x-axis
and thereby, find the corresponding performance (overall ). For capeDJICA,
higher i results a smaller q
NGI, but not necessarily a small overall , i.e., an
optimal i can be chosen based on q
NGI or overall  requirement.
Figure 4: Variation of qNGI and overall  with total number of subjects M for:
(a)-(b) synthetic fMRI data, (c)-(d) real fMRI data. Fixed parameters: S = 4,
δ = 10−5. For a given privacy budget (performance requirement), the user can
use the overall  plot on the right y-axis, shown with solid lines, (qNGI plot on
the left y-axis, shown with dashed lines) to find the required M on the x-axis
and thereby, find the corresponding performance (overall ). For capeDJICA,
higher M results a smaller qNGI and a smaller overall .
vector to the aggregator. And finally, the aggregator sends the R×R updated
weight matrix and R dimensional bias estimate to the sites. If the number of
iterations required to achieve convergence is denoted by J∗ then the total com-
munication cost is proportional to 4J∗(SR2 + SR) or O(S + R2) for the sites
and O(S2 + SR2) for the central node. This is expected as we are estimating
an R×R matrix in a decentralized setting.
6 Experimental Results
In this section, we empirically show the effectiveness of the proposed capeDJICA
algorithm. We note the intricate relationship between  and δ (see Theorem 1)
due to the correlated noise scheme and the challenge of characterizing the overall
privacy loss in our multi-round capeDJICA algorithm. We designed the exper-
iments to better demonstrate the trade-off between performance and several
parameters: , δ and M . We show the simulation results to compare the per-
formance of our capeDJICA algorithm with the existing DP djICA algorithm [1]
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Figure 5: Variation of qNGI and overall  with privacy parameter δ: (a) synthetic
and (b) real fMRI data. Fixed parameters: S = 4, i = 0.5. capeDJICA achieves
very close utility to the non-private djICA with small overall .
(DP− djICA), the non-private djICA algorithm [11] and a DP ICA algorithm op-
erating on only local data (local DP− ICA). We modified the base non-private
djICA algorithm to incorporate the gradient bounds BG and Bh. Although we
are proposing an algorithm for decentralized setting, we included the perfor-
mance indices for the local setting to show the effect of smaller sample sizes on
the performance. We note that the DP− djICA algorithm [1] offers -differential
privacy as opposed to (, δ)-differential privacy offered by capeDJICA. For both
synthetic and real datasets, we consider the symmetric setting (i.e., Ns =
N
S ,
τsG = τG and τ
s
h = τh) and show the average performance over 10 runs of the
algorithms.
Synthetic Data. We generated the synthetic data from the same model as [11].
The source signals S were simulated using the generalized autoregressive (AR)
conditional heteroscedastic (GARCH) model [32,33]. We used M = 1024 simu-
lated subjects in our experiments. For each subject, we generated R = 20 time
courses with 250 time points. The data samples are equally divided into S = 4
sites. For each subject, the fMRI images are 30 × 30 dimensional. We employ
the capePCA algorithm [25] as a preprocessing stage to reduce the sample di-
mension from D = 900 to R = 20. The capeDJICA is carried out upon the
R-dimensional samples.
Real Data. We use the same data and preprocessing as Baker et al. [11]: the
data were collected using a 3-T Siemens Trio scanner with a 12-channel radio
frequency coil, according to the protocol in Allen et al. [15]. In the dataset, the
resting-state scan durations range from 2 min 8 sec to 10 min 2 sec, with an
average of 5 min 16 sec [11]. We used a total of M = 1548 subjects from the
dataset and estimated R = 50 independent components using the algorithms
under consideration. Preprocessing included rigid body alignment for head mo-
tion, slice-timing correction, spatial normalization to MNI space, regression of 6
motion parameters and their derivatives in addition to any trends (up to cubic
or quintic), and spatial smoothing using a 10mm3 full-width at half-maximum
Gaussian kernel. We also projected the data onto a 50-dimensional PCA sub-
space estimated using pooled non-private PCA. As we do not have the ground
truth for the real data, we computed a pseudo ground truth [11] by performing
a pooled non-private analysis on the data and estimating the unmixing ma-
trix. The performance of capeDJICA, djICA, DP− djICA and local DP− ICA
algorithms are evaluated against this pseudo ground truth.
Performance Index. We set τsG =
∆sG
i
√
2 log 1.2510−2 and τ
s
h =
∆sh
i
√
2 log 1.2510−2
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True Spatial Map djICA (M = 1024)
Figure 6: Spatial maps (synthetic data): true and resulting from djICA.
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Figure 7: Spatial maps (synthetic data) resulting from capeDJICA for different
parameters. capeDJICA estimates spatial maps that closely resemble the true
ones, even for strict privacy guarantee (small overall ).
for our experiments, where i is the privacy parameter per iteration, ∆
s
G and ∆
s
h
are the L2 sensitivities of Gs and hs, respectively. To evaluate the performance
of the algorithms, we consider the quality of the estimated unmixing matrix
W. More specifically, we utilize the normalized gain index qNGI [11, 34] that
quantizes the quality of W. The normalized gain index qNGI varies from 0 to
1, with 0 indicating that the unmixing matrix is an identity matrix [34].
Note that, in addition to a small qNGI, we want to attain a strict privacy
guarantee, i.e. small overall (, δ). Recall from Section 4.2 that the overall 
is a function of the number of iterations, the overall δ and {τsG, τsh}. For all of
our experimental analyses, we plotted the overall  (with solid lines on the right
y-axis) along with qNGI (with dashed lines on the left y-axis) as a means for
visualizing how the privacy-utility trade-off varies with different parameters.
Performance Variation with . First, we explore how the privacy-utility
tradeoff between qNGI and the overall “privacy risk”  varies with i. In Figs.
3(a) - (b), we show the variation of qNGI and overall  for different algorithms
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with i on synthetic data. We kept the number of sites S = 4 and the target
δ = 10−5 fixed. As mentioned before, we compare the performance of capeDJICA
with those of the djICA, the DP− djICA and local DP− ICA. We show the per-
formance indices for two different M values, namely M = 256 and M = 1024.
We observe from the figures that the proposed capeDJICA outperforms the exist-
ing DP− djICA by a large margin. This is expected as DP− djICA suffers from
too much noise (see Section 5.1 for the explanation). capeDJICA also guaran-
tees the smallest overall  among the privacy-preserving methods. capeDJICA
can reach the utility level of the non-private djICA for some parameter choices
and naturally outperforms local DP− ICA as estimation of the sources is much
accurate when more samples are available. For the same privacy loss (i.e., for
a fixed ), one can achieve better performance by increasing the number of
subjects. In Figs. 3(c) - (d), we show the variation of qNGI and overall  for
different algorithms with i on real data. We show the performance indices for
M = 256 and M = 1024. We observe that, similar to the synthetic data, the
proposed capeDJICA outperforms the existing DP− djICA by a large margin.
The proposed capeDJICA can reach the utility level of the non-private djICA
even for small overall  values and outperforms local DP− ICA. Again we ob-
serve that, for a fixed , we can achieve better performance by increasing the
number of subjects. For both synthetic and real data, we note that assigning
a higher i may provide a good q
NGI but does not guarantee a small overall .
The user needs to choose the i based on the “privacy budget” and the required
performance.
Performance Variation with M . Next, in Figure 4(a) - (b), we show the
variation of qNGI and the overall  with the total number of subjects M for
two different i values on synthetic data. We kept the number of sites S = 4
and target δ = 10−5 fixed. We observe similar trends in performance as in the
case of varying i. The capeDJICA algorithm outperforms the DP− djICA and
the local DP− ICA: with respect to both qNGI and the overall . For the qNGI,
the capeDJICA performs very closely to the non-private djICA. The performance
gain over DP− djICA is particularly noteworthy. For a fixed number of subjects,
increasing  results in a slightly better utility, albeit at the cost of greater privacy
loss. In Figure 4(c) - (d), we show the variation of qNGI and overall  with
the total number of subjects M for i = 0.1 and i = 1.0 on real data. We
observe a very similar trend as the synthetic data simulations: the capeDJICA
algorithm comfortably outperforms the DP− djICA and the local DP− ICA and
achieves utility close to the non-private djICA even for moderate M values, while
guaranteeing the smallest overall .
Performance Variation with δ. Recall that, the proposed capeDJICA al-
gorithm guarantees (, δ) differential privacy, where (, δ) satisfy the relation
δ = 2 σz−µz φ
(
−µz
σz
)
. In Figure 5, we show the variation of qNGI with overall δ
on synthetic and real data. Recall that δ is essentially the probability of failure
of a DP algorithm. Therefore, we want δ to be small. However, a smaller δ also
results in a larger noise variance, which affects the utility. From the figure, we
can observe how the performance of the proposed capeDJICA algorithm varies
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with δ. We demonstrate the performance indices keeping i = 0.5 and S = 4
fixed. We set the number of colluding sites to be SC =
⌈
S
3
⌉− 1. The proposed
algorithm achieves very close utility to the non-private djICA for both synthetic
and real data. For both cases, the overall  is also very small. However, we can
opt for even smaller δ values at the cost of performance.
Reconstructed Spatial Maps. Finally, we intend to demonstrate how the
estimated spatial maps actually look like, as interpretability is one of the most
important concerns for fMRI applications. In Figure 6, we show the true spatial
map and the one estimated from the non-private djICA [11] algorithm. In Figure
7, we show the estimated spatial maps resulting from the proposed capeDJICA
algorithm along with the overall  for a variety of combinations of i and M .
We observe that when sufficiently large number of subjects are available, the
estimated spatial maps closely resemble the true one, even for strict privacy
guarantee (small overall ). For smaller number of samples, we may need to
compensate by allowing larger  values to achieve good utility. In general,
we observe that capeDJICA can achieve very good approximate to the true
spatial map, almost indistinguishable from the non-private spatial map. This
emphasizes the effectiveness of the proposed capeDJICA in the sense that very
meaningful utility can be achieved even with strict privacy guarantee.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a new and improved algorithm for DP decentralized
joint independent component analysis. The proposed algorithm offers significant
improvement upon our previous work and achieves the same level of additive
noise variance as the pooled data scenario in certain regimes. Therefore, we
attained the same utility as the DP pooled data scenario in a decentralized set-
ting. This is achieved due to the employment of the correlated noise protocol,
assuming the availability of some reasonable resources. We proposed an ex-
tension of the CAPE scheme that can incorporate asymmetric network/privacy
settings, which are more prevalent in medical research scenarios, such as ours.
We analyzed our capeDJICA algorithm using Re´nyi differential privacy and pro-
vided a better account of the privacy loss per iteration using the moments
accountant method. We empirically compared the performance of the proposed
algorithm with those of existing, pooled and local algorithms on synthetic and
real datasets. We varied privacy parameters and relevant dataset parameters
to show that the proposed algorithm outperformed the existing and local algo-
rithms comfortably and matched the performance of the non-private algorithm
for some parameter choices. In general, the proposed algorithm offered very
good utility even for strong privacy guarantees – indicating achievability of
meaningful privacy even without loosing much utility.
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Appendix
A Extension of CAPE: Unequal Sample Sizes at
Sites
Solution to the optimization problem of Section 3.2. We observe that
the variance τ2es of the zero-mean random variable es = eˆs − 1µsS
∑S
i=1 µieˆi can
be computed as
τ2es = Var
[
eˆs − 1
µsS
S∑
i=1
µieˆi
]
= E
eˆ2s + 1µ2sS2
(
S∑
i=1
µieˆi
)2
− 2
µsS
eˆs
S∑
i=1
µieˆi

= σ2s +
1
µ2sS
2
S∑
i=1
µ2iσ
2
i −
2
µsS
· µsσ2s
=
(
1− 2
S
)
σ2s +
1
µ2sS
2
S∑
i=1
µ2iσ
2
i .
Note that we need
∑S
s=1 µ
2
sτ
2
gs = τ
2
pool. One solution is to set τ
2
gs =
1
µ2sS
τ2pool.
Using the constraint and the expression for τ2gs, we have
τ2es + τ
2
gs = τ
2
s
=⇒
(
1− 2
S
)
σ2s +
1
µ2sS
2
S∑
i=1
µ2iσ
2
i +
1
µ2sS
τ2pool = τ
2
s
=⇒
(
1− 1
S
)2
σ2s +
1
µ2sS
2
∑
i 6=s
µ2iσ
2
i = τ
2
s −
1
µ2sS
τ2pool.
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We can write this expression for all s ∈ [S] in matrix form and solve for[
σ21 σ
2
2 . . . σ
2
S
]>
as

(
1− 1S
)2 µ22
µ21S
2 · · · µ
2
S
µ21S
2
µ21
µ22S
2
(
1− 1S
)2 · · · µ2S
µ22S
2
...
...
. . .
...
µ21
µ2SS
2
µ22
µ2SS
2 · · ·
(
1− 1S
)2

−1 
τ21 − τ
2
pool
µ21S
τ22 − τ
2
pool
µ22S
...
τ2S −
τ2pool
µ2SS

Privacy Analysis in Asymmetric Setting. We present an analysis of pri-
vacy for the aforementioned scheme in asymmetric setting. Recall that the
adversary can observe aˆ = [aˆ1, . . . , aˆSH ]
> ∈ RSH and eˆ = ∑s∈SH eˆs. In other
words, the vector y =
[
aˆ>, eˆ
]> ∈ RSH+1 is what the adversary can observe
to make inference about the non-colluding sites. To prove differential privacy
guarantee, we must show that
∣∣∣log g(y|a)g(y|a′) ∣∣∣ ≤  holds with probability (over the
randomness of the mechanism) at least 1 − δ. Here, a = [f(x1), . . . , f(xSH )]>
and g(·|a) and g(·|a′) are the probability density functions of y under a and a′,
respectively. The vectors a and a′ differ in only one coordinate (neighboring).
Without loss of generality, we assume that a and a′ differ in the first coordinate.
We note that the maximum difference is 1Ns as the sensitivity of the function
f(xs) is
1
Ns
. Recall that we release aˆs = f(xs) + es + gs from each site. We
observe
E(aˆs) = f(xs), Var(aˆs) = τ2s , ∀s ∈ [S]
E(aˆs1 aˆs2) = f(xs1)f(xs2)−
µs1σ
2
s1
µs2S
− µs2σ
2
s2
µs1S
+
1
µs1µs2S
2
S∑
i=1
µ2iσ
2
i , ∀s1 6= s2 ∈ [S].
Without loss of generality, we can assume [23] that a = 0 and a′ = a−v, where
v =
[
1
Ns
, 0, . . . , 0
]>
. That is, the random variable aˆ is N (0,Σaˆ), where
Σaˆ =

τ21 Ψ(1, 2) · · · Ψ(1, S)
Ψ(2, 1) τ22 · · · Ψ(2, S)
...
...
. . .
...
Ψ(S, 1) Ψ(S, 2) · · · τ2SH
 ,
and Ψ(i, j) = − 1S
(
µiσ
2
i
µj
+
µjσ
2
j
µi
)
+
∑S
s=1 µ
2
sσ
2
s
µiµjS2
. Additionally, the random variable
eˆ is N (0, τ2eˆ ), where τ2eˆ =
∑SH
s=1 σ
2
s . Therefore, g(y|a) is the density of N (0,Σ),
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where
Σ =
Σaˆ Σaˆeˆ
Σ>aˆeˆ τ
2
eˆ
 ∈ R(SH+1)×(SH+1).
With some simple algebra, we can find the expression for Σaˆeˆ:
Σaˆeˆ =

σ21 − 1µ1S
∑SH
i=1 µ
2
iσ
2
i
σ22 − 1µ2S
∑SH
i=1 µ
2
iσ
2
i
...
σ2SH − 1µSHS
∑SH
i=1 µ
2
iσ
2
i
 .
The rest of the proof proceeds as the proof of Theorem 2. Note that, due to the
complex nature of the expression of Σ, we do not have a closed form solution for
µz and σz. However, we can numerically evaluate their values and consequently,
the resulting δ guarantee.
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B Details of the CAPE Scheme
In this section, we review the recently proposed [19] CAPE scheme. We assume
that all of the S sites and the central node follow the protocol honestly. However,
up to SC =
⌈
S
3
⌉− 1 sites can collude with an adversary to learn about another
site’s data/function output. The central node is also honest-but-curious (and
therefore, can collude with an adversary). An adversary can observe the outputs
from each site, as well as the output from the aggregator. Additionally, the
adversary can know everything about the colluding sites (including their private
data). We denote the number of non-colluding sites with SH such that S =
SC + SH . Without loss of generality, we designate the non-colluding sites with
numbers 1, . . . , SH (see Figure 1(b)).
We design the noise generation procedure such that: i) we can ensure (, δ)
differential privacy of the algorithm output from each site and ii) achieve the
noise level of the pooled data scenario in the final output from the aggregator.
We achieve that by employing a correlated noise addition scheme. Considering
the same decentralized averaging problem as Section 2, we intend to release (and
send to the aggregator) aˆs = f(xs)+es+gs from each site s, where es and gs are
two noise terms. The variances of es and gs are chosen to ensure that the noise
es + gs is sufficient to guarantee (, δ)-differential privacy to f(xs). Here, each
site generates the noise gs ∼ N (0, τ2g ) locally and the noise es ∼ N (0, τ2e ) jointly
with all other sites such that
∑S
s=1 es = 0. We employ the recently proposed
secure aggregation protocol (SecureAgg) by Bonawitz et al. [28] to generate es
that ensures
∑S
s=1 es = 0. The SecureAgg protocol utilizes Shamir’s t-out-of-n
secret sharing [35] and is communication-efficient.
Now, to initiate the CAPE protocol, each site s ∈ [S] generates a noise term
eˆs ∼ N (0, τ2s ) independently. The aggregator computes
∑S
s=1 eˆs according to
the SecureAgg protocol and broadcasts it to all the sites. Each site then sets
es = eˆs − 1
S
S∑
s′=1
eˆs′
to achieve
∑S
s=1 es = 0. We show the complete noise generation procedure
in Algorithm 1. Note that, in the original form, the SecureAgg protocol is
intended for computing sum of D-dimensional vectors in a finite field ZDλ . For
our purposes, we need to perform the summation of Gaussian random variables
over R or RD. To accomplish this, each site can employ a mapping map :
R 7→ Zλ that performs a stochastic quantization [36] for large-enough λ. The
aggregator can compute the sum in the finite field according to SecureAgg and
then invoke a reverse mapping remap : Zλ 7→ R before broadcasting
∑S
s=1 eˆs
to the sites. Algorithm 1 can be readily extended to generate array-valued
zero-sum noise terms.
For our approach of generating eˆs, the variance of es is given [19] by τ
2
e =(
1− 1S
)
τ2s . Additionally, we choose τ
2
g =
τ2s
S . Each site then generates the noise
gs ∼ N (0, τ2g ) independently and sends aˆs = f(xs) + es + gs to the aggregator.
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Note that neither of the terms es and gs has large enough variance to provide
(, δ)-differential privacy guarantee to f(xs). Instead, we chose the variances of
es and gs to ensure that the es + gs is sufficient to ensure a DP guarantee to
f(xs) at site s. The chosen variance of gs also ensures that the output from the
aggregator would have the same noise variance as the DP pooled-data scenario.
To see this, observe that we compute the following quantity at the aggregator
(in Step 6 of Algorithm 2)
acape =
1
S
S∑
s=1
f(xs) +
1
S
S∑
s=1
es +
1
S
S∑
s=1
gs
=
1
N
N∑
n=1
xn +
1
S
S∑
s=1
gs,
where we used
∑
s es = 0. The variance of the estimator acape is τ
2
cape =
τ2s
S2 = τ
2
pool, which is the exactly the same as if all the data were present at
the aggregator. This claim is formalized in Lemma 1. We show the complete
algorithm in Algorithm 2. The privacy of Algorithm 2 is given by Theorem 2.
Theorem 2 (Privacy of CAPE Algorithm (Algorithm 2)). Consider Algorithm
2 in the decentralized data setting of Section 2 with Ns =
N
S and τ
2
s = τ
2 for
all sites s ∈ [S]. Suppose that at most SC =
⌈
S
3
⌉ − 1 sites can collude after
execution. Then Algorithm 2 guarantees (, δ)-differential privacy for each site,
where (, δ) satisfy the relation δ = 2 σz−µz φ
(
−µz
σz
)
and (µz, σz) are given by
µz =
S3
2τ2N2(1 + S)
(
S − SC + 2
S − SC +
9
S−SC S
2
C
S(1 + S)− 3S2C
)
, (13)
σ2z =
S3
τ2N2(1 + S)
(
S − SC + 2
S − SC +
9
S−SC S
2
C
S(1 + S)− 3S2C
)
. (14)
Proof. The proof is given in [19].
Remark 1. Theorem 2 is stated for the symmetric setting: Ns =
N
S and τ
2
s =
τ2 ∀s ∈ [S]. As with many algorithms using the approximate differential privacy,
the guarantee holds for a range of (, δ) pairs subject to a tradeoff constraint
between  and δ, as in the simple case (see Definition 3).
Remark 2 (Utility Analysis). The goal is to ensure (, δ)-differential privacy
for each site and achieve τ2cape = τ
2
pool at the aggregator (see Lemma 1). The
CAPE protocol guarantees (, δ)-differential privacy with δ = 2 σz−µz φ
(
−µz
σz
)
.
Imtiaz et al. empirically showed [19] that this δ guarantee is much better than
the δ guarantee in the conventional decentralized DP scheme. In particular, they
compared δ with δconv, where δconv is the smallest δ guarantee we can afford in
the conventional decentralized DP scheme to achieve the same noise variance
32
as the pooled-data scenario for a given . The authors observed that δ is always
smaller than δconv. That is, for achieving the same noise level at the aggregator
output (and therefore the same utility) as the pooled data scenario, CAPE ensures
a much better privacy guarantee than the conventional approach.
Lemma 1. Consider the symmetric setting: Ns =
N
S and τ
2
s = τ
2 for all sites
s ∈ [S]. Let the variances of the noise terms es and gs (Step 4 of Algorithm
2) be τ2e =
(
1− 1S
)
τ2 and τ2g =
τ2
S , respectively. If we denote the variance of
the additive noise (for preserving privacy) in the pooled data scenario by τ2pool
and the variance of the estimator acape (Step 6 of Algorithm 2) by τ
2
cape then
Algorithm 2 achieves the same expected error as the pooled-data scenario (i.e.,
τ2pool = τ
2
cape).
Proof. The proof is given in [19].
Remark 3. Note that the CAPE algorithm achieves the same noise variance as
the pooled-data scenario (i.e., τ2cape = τ
2
pool) for the symmetric setting: Ns =
N
S
and τ2s = τ
2 for all sites s ∈ [S]. In general, the ratio H(n) = τ
2
cape
τ2pool
, where
n , [N1, N2, . . . , NS ], is a function of the sample sizes in the sites. We observe:
H(n) = N
2
S3
∑S
s=1
1
N2s
. As H(n) is a Schur-convex function, it can be shown
using majorization theory [37] that 1 ≤ H(n) ≤ N2S3
(
1
(N−S+1)2 + S − 1
)
, where
the minimum is achieved for the symmetric setting. That is, CAPE achieves the
smallest noise variance at the aggregator in the symmetric setting.
Proposition 4. (Performance gain) If the local noise variances are {τ2s } for
s ∈ [S] then the CAPE algorithm achieves a gain of G = τ2convτ2cape = S, where τ
2
conv
and τ2cape are the noise variances of the final estimate at the aggregator in the
conventional decentralized DP scheme and the CAPE scheme, respectively.
Proof. The proof is given in [19].
Remark 4 (Site Dropouts). Even in the case of site drop-out, the CAPE scheme
achieves
∑
s es = 0, as long as the number of active sites is above some threshold
(see Bonawitz et al. [28] for details). Therefore, the performance gain of CAPE
remains the same irrespective of the number of dropped-out sites.
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